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Reflecting recent discussions on the psychiatric nursing mailbase, a selective 
overview of the psychiatric nursing literature reveals familiar ways of 
conceptualizing power. These include the subordinate role of nurses to 
medical decision making, and the ability of psychiatric nurses to empower 
otherwise disempowered patients (Barker 1999, Clarke 1999). Abuses of 
power are also described, such as the physical and sexual abuse endemic on 
mixed psychiatric wards (Newton 1996). However, perhaps characteristic of 
the profession's relative lack of interest in the organizational literature, no 
mention is made of the power inherent in the operating style of the settings 
within which nurses work. This is both surprising and ironic, given the 
organizational literature emerging over the last 25 years documenting the way 
bureaucracies shape professional identity (Georgiades & Phillimore 1975, 
Pfeffer 1981, Gilbert 1990, Morgan 1997). 
The aim of this paper is to clarify the hidden dynamic of structural 
organizational power (Pfeffer 1981) and related concepts. To illustrate its 
main elements and discuss its role in the shaping of psychiatric nursing 
identity, I will firstly draw on my own PhD research (Duncan-Grant 1999). 
Structural power served as the 'best analytical fit' to account for the ways in 
which organizational factors shaped the experience and practice of clinical 
supervision among psychiatric nurses. I will go on to argue that this 
conceptual framework also speaks to broader aspects of psychiatric nursing 
professional identity. 
Structural organizational power and related concepts 
According to Pfeffer (1981), structural power is built into the interpersonal and 
material structure of organizations, and thus – by definition – is most effective 
when its exercise is least apparent to organizational members. Familiar and 
repeated procedures (or, 'the way things are done around here') receive a 
rational justification over time, and contribute towards repeated patterns of 
expectation and influence. Pfeffer terms this phenomenon procedural 
rationality: the phenomenon of custom and practice-driven procedures 
becoming institutionalized over time as implicit norms imbued with authority. 
The influence of this authority is constant and is reflected in the interpersonal 
relationships of the organization into which its members are socialized. 
Pockets of dissent are contained and minimized within a kind of overarching 
'common sense', which – in the case of psychiatric nurses – may often be 
disempowering. The established rules and norms of organizations generally 
win out and are taken for granted as common sense, needing little 
justification. 
In my research, organizational patterns of expectation influencing the uptake 
and practice of clinical supervision could be seen in problems around 
ownership of the concept. Deference to rank was reflected in the assumption 
of operational managers that the Trust Board were the group responsible for 
the inception of clinical supervision in the directorate studied. Rank 
awareness also influenced nursing staff, in either waiting until the organization 
provided them with clinical supervision or in the belief that clinical supervision 
should be provided by their line manager. In keeping with organizational 
custom and practice, it is understandable that this method of the delivery of 
clinical supervision would be the one considered most appropriate by the 
Trust. 
The strategic and conceptual literature on clinical supervision influenced 
nurses' views of themselves as accountable for seeking their own supervision, 
and this was reflected in frequent attempts to persuade their line manager to 
provide it. The repeated failure of those attempts illustrate the contradictions 
between the prescriptions of the literature and local organizational custom and 
practice. The need to honour clinical supervision appointments usually 
conflicted with other activities viewed as more important. 
Key elements in the maintenance of structural organizational power include 
the influence of emotional management on organizational survival (Fineman 
1993) and the interpersonal self-presentation rules to which all of us conform 
(Goffman 1969). Regarding emotional management, organizations develop 
and sanction 'feeling rules'. These are reflected, materially, in areas where it 
is safe or unsafe to express emotion. Ironically, given clinical supervision in 
nursing's contemporary celebration of open disclosure (Butterworth et al.  
1997), authentic displays of emotion were generally discouraged in clinical 
supervision sessions, while, in contrast, many research participants appeared 
to feel safe enough to talk about their supervision horror stories in interviews 
with me. 
The contradiction between the prescriptions of the clinical supervision in 
nursing and mental health nursing literature and local organizational norms 
thus influenced the way individuals managed their emotions. In further 
illustration of this point, there existed an implicit contract, within which 
supervisees needed to be seen to be coping with their job. In related terms, 
in-house line supervi-sion by their managers was the rule rather than the 
exception. This meant that the potential for the supervision agenda imposed 
by supervisors to be punitive and critical, and for confidentiality breaches to 
occur, was increased. It was thus clearly not in the interests of supervisees to 
display emotional vulnerability within supervision sessions. 
Turning to the importance of self-presentation in organizations, supervisee 
and supervisor often had shared histories in the mental health directorate 
prior to starting their supervision relationship. The fact that organizational 
relationships frequently preceded and informed clinical supervision 
relationships influenced the form of face-saving and impression-management 
strategies. A major issue emerging was that it seemed, in the main, that 
amicable organizational relationships could only be maintained at the expense 
of effective clinical supervision relationships. 
Given the above, there is a clear conceptual problem with clinical supervision 
in the nursing and mental health nursing literature. In treating the concept in a 
one-dimensional, decontextual way, nurses are exhorted to embrace clinical 
supervision while the probable local difficulties involved in this task are either 
effaced or played down. Quite simply, organizational factors restrict the 
success of psychiatric nurses' attempts to live up to the prescriptions of the 
clinical supervision literature. By implication, this strongly suggests a need to 
scrutinize some of the claims of contemporary writers on what psychiatric 
nursing is or should be about, with regard to the degree to which they take 
account of the nature of organizational power. 
I have chosen to limit my discussion mainly, but not exclusively, to the work of 
Barker and Clarke. I do so because of my affection for, and familiarity with, 
their writing, which has been pivotal in the development of my own work. After 
a brief critical discussion of their relative contributions, I will go on to argue 
that neither pay sufficient attention to the importance of organizational factors 
in the development of professional identity, effectively undermining their 
claims. 
Barker's new nurse spiritualism 
Barker (1997) regards psychiatric nurses as spiritual healers, distinguishing 
their contribution to psychiatric and mental health care from that of other 
professions. How nurses actually do this is, for Barker, 'the question I am least 
confident about asking'. The moral and ethical day-to-day tasks of psychiatric 
nursing are described as key mediating factors (Barker 1999). Barker's 
morality is based upon the standards of behaviour governing what is 
considered appropriate by the profession and by society, while ethical practice 
is reflected in how such standards are monitored. 
Complementing his spiritual position, Barker (1999) displays a humanistic-
existentialist view of psychiatric nursing, in at least three senses. First, from a 
neo-Rogerian perspective, he claims that the proper focus of psychiatric 
nursing is in helping individuals grow and develop within the limits of their 
personal and environmental circumstances. Secondly, he argues that 
psychiatric nurses are necessarily always making ethical choices, based upon 
professional values underpinning their attitudes. Finally, acknowledging, with 
Clarke, that such decision making is constrained by the medically led 
hierarchy that nurses find themselves in, he exhorts them – in the interests of 
professionalizing – to rise above such constraints. 
The above claims are seductive. However, from the perspective of the role, 
impact and form of structural power argued earlier, both generic and specialist 
psychiatric nurses may in reality often find it very difficult to challenge and 
overcome the invisible exercise of organizational power, of which ongoing 
medical leadership is simply an element. Specifically, what nurses do at any 
one time, as opposed to what they might like to do (for some at least, 
influenced by Barker's writing), is likely to generally conform to that which has 
been established in local custom and practice, and related patterns of 
expectation and influence. 
Self-presentation and emotional management factors will contribute to this 
process, influencing the public behaviour of nurses in the maintenance of self-
esteem. As a general principle, despite frequent exceptions to the rule, nurses 
– like all of us – want to get on with their colleagues and be seen to be coping 
with their jobs. Specifically, this is likely to result in tensions between what 
they feel privately and express publicly, and strategies to help them maintain 
good face in the organization. Finally, the gap between their postqualification 
idealism and the values and behaviours they need to develop to survive in the 
work settings they find themselves in will gradually reduce (Georgiades & 
Phillimore 1975). 
If, however, for the sake of argument, it were possible for the majority of 
nurses to rise above organizational procedural rationality in decision making 
and choice, then it is important to consider the preparation of psychiatric 
nurses for this ethical endeavour. In keeping with his style of refusing to 
articulate the fine detail of other aspects of his case, Barker (1999) side-steps 
this problem in his zen-influenced assertion that training individuals in ethical 
practice is a contradiction in terms. 
With a reading of Barker as a neo-Rogerian, if self-awareness is considered 
an essential element of ethical practice, there are important educational and 
organizational implications emerging from this. To take a local example, 
there's a certain poverty in the emphasis on self-awareness for student 
psychiatric nurses as a year-one modular topic only at the University of 
Brighton. This is compounded by the fact that the theoretical background for 
this is, in large part, based on the kind of Rogerian-like strands which Barker 
displays in his writing (Barker 1999, Clarke 1999). 
It seems plausible to argue that Rogerian influences pervade curricula and 
group-think at least in part because of their function as a kind of comforting 
porridge (L. Clarke, personal communication). This seeps through module 
development and educational delivery, serving to insulate against the real-
world organizational constraining and shaping factors that nurses will, in 
reality, find themselves in both during and after training. Few would deny the 
often positive influence of Rogerian principles for the human caring services 
over the last few decades. However, there is a clear danger in its teaching 
and reception by students as a totalitarian psychotherapeutic world-view, 
because of a lack of consideration of qualifying, balancing and sometimes 
contradictory psychotherapeutic and social-psychological factors (Clarke 
1999). A facile, non-critical acceptance of Rogerian and neo-Rogerian 
principles turns the approach into a minimally demanding fairy tale for 
grownups. Little consideration is given to the actual form and exercise of 
organizational power in limiting the effectiveness of such interventions and to 
related interpersonal factors undermining them. 
Further, an ethically driven self-awareness that is at least implicitly associated 
with Rogerian principles merits close and critical empirical scrutiny. In spite of, 
over decades, a consistent lack of evidence demonstrating the sufficiency of 
the Rogerian approach for personal helping and change (Shapiro 1969, 
Dallard 1999), the appeal of Rogerian-derived interventions for counselling, 
psychotherapy and psychiatric nursing continues to thrive. This appeal 
arguably lies in its comfortingly simplistic and de-contextual presentation: 
professional backgrounds aside, all you need is a facilitator-listener armed 
with a minimal amount of skills, knowledge and theory, and a client or patient. 
Structural organizational constraints and related interpersonal factors which 
make the approach problematic are treated (or ignored) as superfluous. 
Clarke's new nurse fundamentalism 
Clarke (1999), like Barker, wants to clarify a 'proper focus' for psychiatric 
nursing. However, in criticism of Barker's overall thesis, he argues that 
humanistic psychiatric nursing practitioners are, in reality, in the minority, with 
the majority of psychiatric nursing practice influenced by medical decision 
making. He reminds us that the working majority of psychiatric nurses 
continue to practice in institutional settings, asserting that they are content to 
give out drugs and assist in electroconvulsive therapy. In keeping with the 
principles and examples of structural power outlined above, he is correct in 
stating that what most psychiatric nurses do, in other words, is prescribed by 
organizational expectation and influence. 
Current writing within the Royal College of Nursing continuing professional 
development framework, and observations of the dialogue on the psychiatric 
nursing mailbase, supports Clarke's views. In reviewing contemporary 
treatments for the problem, Parsons (1999/2000) concludes that the 'role of 
the nurse in working with someone with depression is essentially that of 
support and monitoring, working with the depressed person to help him or her 
progress towards recovery'. With regard to what the nurse actually does to aid 
this, Parson's words simultaneously echo both Barker's neo-Rogerian position 
and Clarke's views on nurses' medical subservience, while, ironically, rubber 
stamping organizational custom and practice. To quote from Parsons, 'The 
importance of simply being with the depressed person and valuing their 
experience, at the same time as supporting medical treatment and 
interventions, cannot be over-emphasised.' 
Much of the discussion space in the psychiatric nursing mailbase in 1999 was 
taken up with issues around day-to-day practice: handovers, close 
observation, and, from time to time, complaints about the power differential 
between doctors and nurses. In Clarke's terms, supporting Pfeffer's views on 
structural organizational power, the source of the socialization for this 
dialogue clearly seems to be in the reality of working within institutional 
settings. However, despite developing a social–psychological dimension to his 
case to a greater extent than Barker, Clarke's organizational polemic is flawed 
in the area of what psychiatric nurses should do in their day-to-day practice. 
He argues that the proper focus of psychiatric nursing is around 'ordinary 
decency', psychiatric nurses relating to their patients pragmatically in terms of 
what they need at any particular point in time. 'Ordinary decency' is a term 
defined negatively – the proper location for psychiatric nursing lying 
somewhere in the middle of two poles, with transpersonal and spiritual 
approaches at one end and specialist therapies at the other. Clarke fails, 
however, to clarify what the concept might amount to, in other than negative 
terms. 
A major problem emerges from this polemic: psychiatric nurses are exhorted 
to jettison unnecessary and superfluous theories and models which fail to 
capture the real demands of their largely practical task. Doing so will 
supposedly leave nurse–patient relationships free of any external mediating 
influences. However, in line with my criticism of Barker above, it is arguably 
likely that the organizational context in which nurses work will socialize them 
to a common-sense justification for doing what they do. Because of this, 
aspirations and claims to 'ordinary decency' may simply amount to 
rationalizations made within, and to justify, local custom and practice. All staff 
working in bureaucratic environments operate according to pre-established 
material and interpersonal rules which, necessarily, influence nurse–patient 
relationships. To cite a specific example, it is probable that many otherwise 
decent nurses are currently engaged in subtle but effective coercion of 
informal patients to accept treatment in inpatient settings (Lindow 1993). 
Conclusion 
After giving a very brief overview of the form of the dialogue around power in 
some of the litera-ture and electronic discussions among psychiatric nurses, I 
used examples from my own research to illustrate Pfeffer's organizational 
structural power concept. I argued that this is useful in accounting for some of 
the ways in which aspects of psychiatric nursing identity are shaped by the 
work settings within which psychiatric nurses are employed. 
Turning to contemporary visions about what psychiatric nursing is or should 
be about, I went on to propose that neither Barker nor Clarke take sufficient 
account of those organizational operating factors to make their work coherent, 
and that this is not helped by their refusal to spell out what doing nursing 
would be like within their respective visions. Barker's neo-Rogerianism seems 
to have implications for an educational context which colludes in a view of 
psychiatric nursing practice stripped of its real world organizational shaping 
context. Clarke, while going further than Barker in this area, still ultimately 
produces a confused argument. While clearly acknowledging that nursing 
identity is mediated by structural factors, he calls for a form of psychiatric 
nursing practice amounting to unmediated 'ordinary decency'. 
A possible objection to the structural power framework I have proposed is that 
it does not allow for progress within psychiatric nursing, or for psychiatric 
nurses to shape their own identities. It is certainly the case that generic and 
specialist psychiatric nursing advanced considerably in the last century (Nolan 
1993, Newell & Gournay 1994). This points to the role of positive conceptions 
of power in bringing about change (Foucault 1978, Fee 2000). However, in 
spite of this, the structural power concept clearly speaks to the pace of 
change in the gap between prescription and organizational custom and 
practice. While relatively free to progress and increasingly professionalize 
over time, psychiatric nursing identity generally remains, in large part, a 
function of the material and interpersonal operating principles of the work 
settings in which nurses are employed. 
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